Computationalism or Functionalism

Functionalism or Computationalism is the idea that consciousness is merely a byproduct of complex information processing; it's the dominant view in modern neuroscience.. However, it faces severe philosophical challenges.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness 

The most famous refutation comes from philosopher David Chalmers, who distinguishes between the Easy Problems and the Hard Problem.   

• The Easy Problems: These involve explaining functions; how the brain discriminates stimuli, integrates information, or controls behavior. Complex processing can theoretically explain all of these. We can build a robot that processes heat damage and moves its hand away.

• The Hard Problem: This asks why that processing is accompanied by a subjective experience (qualia). Why doesn't the processing just happen "in the dark" like a computer script running in the background?   

• The Refutation: You can fully explain the mechanism (the complex processing) without ever explaining the experience. Therefore, consciousness is something over and above the processing.  

The Chinese Room Argument (John Searle)

This thought experiment attacks the idea that syntax (processing symbols) creates semantics (understanding meaning).

• The Scenario: Imagine a man in a closed room who doesn't speak Chinese. He has a rulebook (the program) that tells him how to manipulate Chinese characters. If he receives a certain symbol, the book tells him to output another specific symbol.

• The Result: To an observer outside, the man appears to understand Chinese perfectly; he is passing the Turing Test. However, the man actually understands nothing. He is just manipulating symbols based on shape.

• The Implications: Digital computers are just faster versions of this man. They manipulate 1s and 0s (syntax) but have no understanding of what those symbols represent (semantics). Therefore, no amount of complex processing of syntax will ever magically turn into understanding.

The Knowledge Argument (Mary’s Room)

Proposed by Frank Jackson, this argument suggests that knowing all the physical facts about processing isn't the same as having the experience.

• The Scenario: Mary is a brilliant neuroscientist who knows everything there is to know about the physics of color and how the brain processes color wavelengths. However, she has lived her entire life in a black-and-white room.   

• The Event: One day, she steps outside and sees a red rose.

• The Question: Does she learn something new?

• The Refutation: Most people agree she learns what it is like to see red. If she learns something new, then her previous "complete" knowledge of the physical processing was actually incomplete. Therefore, conscious experience is not reducible to physical processing.  

The Zombie Argument (P-Zombies)

This is a logical possibility argument.

It is logically possible to conceive of a "Philosophical Zombie"- a creature that is atom-for-atom identical to you and processes information exactly as you do, but has zero inner experience. It screams when hit, but feels no pain.

If such a creature is logically conceivable (even if not physically possible in our world), it proves that processing and consciousness are conceptually distinct. You can have one without the other, meaning they are not the same thing.

The Binding Problem

Information processing in computers is discrete and fragmented.

• The Fragmented Processor: In a computer, data is stored in different addresses and processed sequentially or in parallel threads that don't "know" about each other.

• The Unified Mind: Conscious experience, however, is unified. You don't experience "red" + "shape" + "motion" as separate data streams; you experience a moving red ball.   

• The Refutation: There is no known mechanism for how billions of discrete processing events in the brain "bind" together to form a single, unified subjective field. Merely adding more complexity to the processing doesn't explain how the unity emerges.

Panpsychism

This article should be read in conjunction with my thoughts on why Philosophical Naturalism Cannot Account for Qualia

Panpsychism is the philosophical view that consciousness (mind or mind-like qualities) is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality, present in all matter, from subatomic particles to complex organisms, not just humans and animals. It offers a potential solution to the "hard problem of consciousness". It suggests complex consciousness arises from simpler forms of consciousness in fundamental entities, rather than emerging from purely non-conscious matter, though it faces the difficult combination difficulty of how these micro-experiences form unified macro-experiences.

Note: Micro-consciousness is a theoretical concept, not a scientifically established phenomenon with definitive proof/evidence

Here are the primary arguments used to refute panpsychism:

The Combination Problem

This is widely considered the most damning objection to panpsychism. It accepts the premise that atoms might have "micro-consciousness" but asks: How do billions of tiny, separate consciousnesses combine to form the singular, unified "I" that you experience?

Putting 100 separate people in a room does not create a "super-consciousness" that thinks all their thoughts at once. They remain 100 separate minds. Critics argue that a brain full of conscious atoms should result in billions of tiny minds, not one big one.

Subjectivity is inherently private. There is no known mechanism for multiple subjects to merge into a single new subject.

The Empirical & Physics Objection

Physicists and philosophers of science often reject panpsychism because it appears to conflict with our current understanding of the physical world.

 Panpsychists face a trap regarding what this consciousness actually does to the particle:

Scenario A (It does something): If an electron's consciousness affects its movement, it would violate the Standard Model of Physics. We can predict particle behavior with extreme precision; if mental forces were pushing particles around, we would have noticed the anomalies.

Scenario B (It does nothing): If the consciousness doesn't affect the particle's behavior, then it is epiphenomenal (causally useless). Evolution could not select for it, and it becomes a ghost property that explains nothing.

Critics argue panpsychism is antiscientific and unfalsifiable because it is impossible to test. Since we cannot measure the inner life of an electron, the theory can never be proven or disproven, making it more akin to fantasy than science.

The Emergence Argument (Redundancy)

This argument posits that panpsychism tries to solve a problem that doesn't exist by looking in the wrong place.

Critics argue consciousness is likely a result of structure (how things are arranged), not substance (what things are made of).

For example, "Wetness" is not a property of a single water molecule; it is an emergent property that happens when millions of molecules come together. You don't need to invent "proto-wetness" for every atom to explain the ocean. Similarly, you don't need "proto-consciousness" to explain the brain.

Occam’s Razor: Panpsychism adds a massive complication (trillions of minds in every object) to explain a localized phenomenon (brains). Materialists argue it is simpler to assume consciousness emerges from complex processing.

Note: Occam’s Razor is basically "The simplest explanations are most frequently the right ones."

The Problem of Discontinuity 

If consciousness is fundamental, it should apply everywhere. This leads to counter-intuitive conclusions that critics find absurd.

• Arbitrary Lines: Does a rock have a unified mind, or just a collection of mineral minds? If you cut a rock in half, do you now have two rock minds? Panpsychism struggles to define what constitutes a "conscious entity" versus a mere "pile of conscious stuff".

• Inanimate Suffering: If consciousness is ubiquitous, it raises ethical absurdities, such as whether a thermostat feels "hot" or if chopping a vegetable causes pain to its atoms.

Philosophical Naturalism Cannot Account for Qualia

Critics of naturalism argue that even a complete scientific description of the brain processes involved (e.g., neural structures and functions) leaves out the intrinsic, inner feeling of the experience itself. This is sometimes referred to as the "explanatory gap" or the "hard problem of consciousness". The argument is that no amount of physical description can answer why a specific physical process is accompanied by an inner feeling at all.

Definitions 

Qualia:  the raw, subjective qualities of experience—the "what it's like" aspect of having a sensation. Examples include the ouchiness of pain, the redness of a sunset, or the taste of a lemon.

Philosophical naturalism: The view that only natural laws and forces exist; the universe is a closed system, excluding deities or spirit. Also known as Metaphysical Naturalism

Naturalism: The Objective View

Naturalism is defined by its reliance on objective, third-person descriptions.

It posits that everything in the universe can be fully explained by natural processes and laws, as understood through empirical science. Science describes the world from the "outside." For example, a scientist can describe a brain state by measuring neuron firing rates, chemical levels, and electrical signals. These are facts that any observer can verify.

Qualia: The Subjective View

Qualia represents the subjective, first-person nature of experience, which stands in direct contrast to objective data.

Qualia refers to the "qualitative aspects" of consciousness—specifically, "what it's like" to be in a certain state. This includes the "ouchiness" of pain, the specific taste of a lemon, or the sensation of seeing the color red. These are facts that only the subject (the person experiencing them) can access.

The Conflict

The conflict is that these two descriptions do not seem to overlap.

Critics argue that even if you have a "complete scientific description" of the brain's physical processes (the objective view), you have still left out the "intrinsic, inner feeling" of the experience (the subjective view). The problem is naturalism claims to explain everything via physical laws, but if it cannot explain why a physical process feels like something from the inside, then its explanation of the universe is incomplete.

The Explanatory Gap

The "Explanatory Gap" is the term used to describe the fundamental disconnect between physical biological processes and subjective conscious experience.

Science can theoretically provide a complete scientific description of the brain, mapping every neural structure and function involved in a reaction. However, this description completely leaves out the intrinsic, inner feeling of the experience itself.

Even if you fully understand the mechanics of how the brain processes light waves (the "easy" problem), there is nothing in that physical description that explains why that process should feel like seeing red rather than seeing blue or why it should feel like anything at all. This is why the explanatory gap is often referred to as the hard problem of consciousness.

The Unanswered "Why"

Ultimately, the explanatory gap highlights a limitation in naturalistic explanations. The core argument is that no amount of describing how neurons fire can answer the question of why that specific physical process is accompanied by an inner conscious feeling.

Note: The quale of "seeing red" is the unique, subjective, intrinsic feeling or raw feel of redness, which is the internal, private experience itself, distinct from the physical properties like light wavelengths or brain activity that cause it; it's what makes seeing red feel like red and not blue, a warm, alerting, visceral sensation.

The implications of Philosophical Naturalism inability to Account for Qualia

Naturalism claims the natural world (governed by physical laws) is all that exists. If qualia (subjective feelings) are real but cannot be broken down into physical processes (like neurons firing), they represent a reality outside physical laws. Thus a complete scientific/naturalistic explanation of the universe would actually be incomplete because it fails to describe the subjective reality of existence.

If facts exist (like "what it feels like to see red") that are not physical facts, then the core tenet of Naturalism, that only physical things exist, is incorrect. This suggests consciousness might be a fundamental constituent of the universe (like mass or energy) rather than a biological accident. This pushes toward alternatives like Panpsychism (mind is everywhere) or Dualism, both of which contradict Philosophical Naturalism.

For more on Panpsychism see here. 

Functionalism and Emergentism. 

These are two Naturalist responses that attempt to account for qualia without resorting to Dualism (souls) or Eliminativism (saying feelings don't exist).

Functionalism: "It's What It Does, Not What It Is"

Functionalism is currently the dominant theory in the philosophy of mind. It argues that a mental state (like "pain") is defined solely by its functional role, its cause-and-effect relationship with inputs, outputs, and other mental states.

Functionalists argue that "pain" isn't a specific biological material (like C-fibers firing). Instead, "pain" is just whatever state is caused by tissue damage and causes you to scream or pull away.

This theory allows for the possibility that aliens or AI could have qualia. If a silicon robot has an internal state that functions exactly like your pain state, then the robot is in pain.

Functionalists view the mind as software running on the brain's hardware. They argue that qualia are simply the way this software processes information about the world.

The biggest problem for functionalism is the "Philosophical Zombie" argument. Critics argue you could build a robot that functions perfectly (screams when hit) but has zero inner experience. If that's possible, then functionalism is missing the most important part: the feeling itself.

Emergentism: "More Than the Sum of Its Parts"

Emergentism takes a different approach. It accepts that qualia might be undeniably different from standard physical matter, but argues they are a natural byproduct of complexity.

Just as "wetness" is a property of water that doesn't exist in a single hydrogen atom, consciousness is a property that "emerges" when billions of neurons interact in a specific complex network.

Weak Emergence: Qualia are surprising, but if we knew enough about the brain, we could deduce them from the physics (just like we can explain a hurricane if we know enough about air molecules).

Strong Emergence: Qualia are a fundamentally new kind of natural phenomenon that appears at a high level of complexity. They cannot be reduced to just physics, but they are still natural laws, not supernatural ones.  Emergentists argue that we shouldn't expect to find "feelings" in atoms. Qualia are a higher-level reality that nature produces when matter gets organized enough.

Summary Comparison of Functionalism and Emergentism

Theory	View on Qualia	The Metaphor
Functionalism	Qualia are functions. If it acts like pain, it is pain.	Software: The code determines the outcome, regardless of the computer brand.
Emergentism	Qualia are complex properties. They arise from the system's structure.	Wetness: Water molecules aren't wet, but the ocean is.

Refuting Functionalism

Functionalism argues that mental states are defined by what they do (their cause-and-effect role), not what they feel like. The primary refutation is that it is possible to replicate the function without replicating the feeling.

• The "Philosophical Zombie" (Absent Qualia): This is the most famous objection. It is theoretically possible to build a system (like a silicon robot) that functions exactly like a human, like screaming when hit, avoiding damage, and processing data, but has zero inner experience. If such a "zombie" is possible, then having the right "functional state" is not enough to guarantee consciousness.

• Inverted Qualia: Functionalism cannot account for the specific nature of an experience. Two people could function identically (both call a strawberry red and stop at traffic lights), but one might internally experience "green" while the other experiences "red." Since their functional roles are identical, but their experiences are different, functionalism fails to explain the experience itself.

• The "China Brain": Philosophers like Ned Block argue that if you organized the entire population of China to pass signals to each other via walkie-talkies in the exact same pattern as neurons in a brain, the nation would be functionally identical to a mind. However, it is absurd to claim the nation itself would suddenly feel pain or taste chocolate. Therefore, function alone does not create a soul or mind.

Refuting Emergentism

Emergentism argues that consciousness is a property that naturally appears ("emerges") once matter reaches a certain level of complexity, much like "wetness" emerges from water molecules. The refutation argues this is a label, not an explanation.

• The "Brute Fact" Objection (It's Just "Magic"): Critics argue that saying consciousness "emerges" is scientifically empty. Unlike "wetness" (which can be deduced from the geometry and forces of H2O molecules), there is no logical way to deduce "subjective feeling" from "neuron complexity." Saying it "emerges" is just a fancy way of saying "a miracle happens here" without explaining how or why.

• The Explanatory Gap Remains: Weak emergence (like a traffic jam emerging from cars) is easy to explain because the whole is just the sum of the parts. But consciousness requires Strong Emergence—where a completely new type of reality (subjective experience) pops out of objective matter. This violates the scientific principle of continuity; you cannot get "subjectivity" out of "objectivity" just by adding more parts.

• The Causal Exclusion Problem: If physical laws (neurons firing) fully explain why your hand moves, then the "emergent" conscious mind has nothing left to do. It becomes a "ghost" that watches but cannot act. If emergentists claim the mind does act back on the brain ("downward causation"), they violate the fundamental laws of physics.

The Killing of the Canaanites was not Genocide

“As the flame burning the child surrounded the body, the limbs would shrivel up and the mouth would appear to grin as if laughing, until it was shrunk enough to slip into the cauldron” – Greek historian Kleitarchos (Cleitarchus or Clitarchus) on the Canaanite practice of child sacrifice. 

The killing of the Canaanites was not genocide (an arbitrary killing based on ethnicity) but rather capital punishment (judicial execution) mandated by God for specific, extreme moral depravity. God, as the author of life, and the ultimate source and standard of morality, has the right to judge nations for their conduct.

The Canaanite culture was uniquely wicked. Specific crimes cited include: Burning children alive as offerings to the god Molech. Widespread incest, bestiality, adultery, and homosexuality. Sexual acts (both heterosexual and homosexual) were integrated into their religious worship of deities like Baal and Asherah. See John Day’s book, Molech: A God of Human Sacrifice in the Old Testament. Day is a leading scholar on this subject.

This judgment was not racially motivated. God explicitly warned the Israelites (in Leviticus 18) that if they committed these same abominations, the land would “vomit” them out, just as it did the Canaanites. Israel was eventually judged and exiled for falling into these exact practices. The command to drive out or destroy the Canaanites was intended to prevent the spiritual and moral infection of Israel. When Israel failed to fully remove the Canaanites, they were indeed “Canaanized,” adopting the same destructive practices. Critics who label this as genocide often overlook the gravity of the sins involved (particularly child sacrifice) and the theological context that God judges all people by the same moral standard.

1. Ancient Warfare Rhetoric or Hyperbole

We must not read ancient military texts with a 21st century literalist mindset. It was a specific type of Ancient Near Eastern “trash talking”.

Archaeological Steles which prove that “total destruction” was a rhetorical idiom, not literal reality.

• Merneptah Stele (13th Century BC): The Egyptian Pharaoh boasts, “Israel is laid waste, his seed is not.” (13th century BC) Obviously this was not true, Israel obviously was not destroyed.

• Mesha Stele: Mesha boasts that “Israel hath perished forever” and that he killed “all 7,000 men, boys, women… for I had devoted them to destruction.” However, we know from history and the Bible that Israel continued to exist and fight Moab. The use of idioms like “devoted to destruction” (herem) means this is a boast of a decisive military victory, not a total genocide.

The Bible itself contradicts “utterly destroyed” meaning “every last person is dead”.

• In Joshua 10:38-39, the text states that Joshua utterly destroyed Hebron and Debir leaving none remaining. Yet in Judges 1:11 (within decades of Joshua’s death) Israel must fight the armies of Hebron and Debir as if they are new enemies. It is historically impossible for a city to be totally destroyed with no survivors and yet immediately be a military threat, unless the first description was hyperbole.

• In 1 Samuel 15 & 27-30): Saul is commanded to “utterly destroy” the Amalekites (man, woman, child, infant). However, Amalekites reappear as a threat just a few chapters later (1 Samuel 27 & 30). In addition, Haman the Agagite (villain in the book of Esther) is a descendant of the Amalekite king Agag. The Bible itself doesn’t treat the “total destruction” as if it happened literally.

• Scholars, Richard Hess and Paul Copan, point out the Hebrew word for “city” (ir) in these contexts almost certainly means military citadel or administrative stronghold, not civilian population center. The civilians lived in the surrounding countryside and would flee at the first sign of war. It is thus the attack on the city (Jericho or Ai) is an attack on a military garrison (likely containing ~100 soldiers) and its political leadership.

2. Divine Judgment Against Specific Evil

The Bible portrays the Canaanite culture not just as unbelieving, but as vomit-inducingly evil. God would make the land "vomit them out" (Leviticus 18). The conquest was thus not imperialist land-grabbing or ethnic cleansing, but a one-off act of divine judicial sentence on a culture that had become morally unlivable. The key evil they are alleged to have practiced is institutionalized burning of children. Archaeologists have discovered tophets – burial grounds containing thousands of urns with the cremated remains of infants. This is proof that the Canaanite conquest was a war of spiritual significance against a demonic practice.

God said to Abraham (Genesis 15) that his descendants would not inherit the land for 400 years because "the sin of the Amorites is not yet complete." So God waited centuries, giving the Canaanites time, before authorizing judgment. It was not an over-reaction, knee-jerk militarism. We should not think of this in terms of a superpower steam rolling a weak country. Israel was the underdog battling a culture of wickedness and walled cities. We should rather think of it like a police SWAT team raiding a violent gang’s hideout to stop them from murdering innocents – an act of force that is morally justifiable because of the evil it prevents.

3. Theological Consistency

The sparing of Rahab (a Canaanite prostitute) and her family demonstrates that the ban was not on the basis of ethnicity. It was on the basis of religious allegiance. A Canaanite who turned to Yahweh was spared and included in the community.

The Old Testament God is not some mean guy, but "Jesus as nice guy" is false as well because Jesus himself is the warrior judge who rides in on horseback in Revelation 19 and judges nations with a sword. A perfect God must be a holy God who is angry at evil (like child sacrifice). We shouldn't worship a God that doesn't get angry at such evil.

In the end, the judgment of Canaan points to the Cross, where God takes the judgment of sin upon Himself and gives mercy to all who will turn to Him (like Rahab).

The Atheist and the Bear

An atheist is hiking in the woods, when suddenly a huge bear pops up from behind a bush, right, as the bear is about to attack him, time freezes. Then God appears before him.

 
God: You have spent your whole life as an atheist, but if you finally believe in me and become Christian. I will stop the bear from eating you,

Atheist: Oh, that's really nice of you. But, nah, I don't really believe in a higher power.

God: All you have to do is believe. Just believe your eyes and accept me in your heart,

Atheist: Nah, it's just too hard for me to do. I mean, science has already answered how he came about for evolution, and not only that with all the bad things happening in the world right now. I think it's just too difficult to believe that there's a God.

God: Are you sure? I'll give you a little more opportunity to believe in me. Take your time and think about it.

Atheist: Nope, don't be any time. No, thanks,

God: Okay, you've made your choice.

Atheist: Wait, how about this? Why don't you make the bear Christine instead? And then I'll have some morals and then leave me alone.

God: Very well.

After God left, time restarted, the bear suddenly stopped, and the man smiled. His plan to save himself clearly worked,

Then the bear kneeled down and said. "Thank you God, for this meal I'm about to receive". .

Eden Found?

The Garden of Eden was a real geographical location that existed roughly 14,000 years ago in what is now the Persian Gulf.

 Critics often dismiss Eden as a myth because Genesis 2 describes four rivers (Tigris, Euphrates, Pishon, and Gihon) connected to one source, which does not match modern geography 

However, during the last Ice Age (approx. 14,000 years ago), lower sea levels meant the Persian Gulf was a dry, fertile valley. Satellite imaging reveals that ancient riverbeds (likely the Pishon and Gihon) once flowed into this basin alongside the Tigris and Euphrates.

The Pishon River most likely is the now-dried "Wadi Batin" river flowing from Arabia (Biblical Havilah), a region known for gold

The Gihon River most likely is the Karun River flowing from the Zagros Mountains. It's argued "Cush" in Genesis 2 is a mistranslation of the "Kassites," who lived in western Iran, rather than Ethiopia 

The Hebrew text can be interpreted as four rivers meeting to form one central water source, rather than one splitting into four. This matches the geography of the ancient Gulf basin where these rivers converged. 

Archaeologists refer to this lost area as the "Gulf Oasis." It was likely a lush paradise watered by subterranean freshwater springs (matching the "mist" mentioned in Genesis) with abundant resources 

Conclusion: This fertile region was flooded by rising sea levels between 8,000 and 13,000 years ago. The Genesis account preserves an ancient oral tradition of this real, lost place, suggesting the story is much older than the Babylonian exile period 

Quantum Mechanics Says...

I hear this in real life and online, someone will try to make a point about Christianity by citing Quantum Mechanics. But that's a bit of a misnomer.  What they should say is "the Von Neumann–Wigner interpretation of QM says..." or "the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM says..."

That because there are a few dozen interpretations of quantum mechanics and nobody knows which one, if any, is right. Physicist Sean Carroll calls the lack of consensus on quantum mechanics interpretation an "embarrassment"

So I always point this out and then ask 1) which interpretation are you talking about and 2) why do you think it's correct. It's a bit of presuppositional apologetics - questioning their underlying assumptions or beliefs instead of taking them for granted. 

Another example of presuppositional apologetics would be when someone, usually an atheist or materialist, cites “reality” in their criticism or argument. I'll ask, 1) what is reality, or the state of everything that exists?  2) And how do you know?  They typically cannot answer either question. If they still want to press their point using “reality”, I'll ask how strong is your point if you can't define nor defend what reality is?  This often ends the conversation, but hopefully they will rethink their position and start asking some fundamental question. Maybe take that skeptical spotlight and shine it at their own feet to ensure that they do not have their feet planted in midair. 

In any case, here are the top 20 interpretations of quantum mechanics, ranging from the standard textbook views to more exotic or historical hypotheses. 

They all use the same equations (like the Schrödinger equation) to predict the probabilities of experimental outcomes, and so far, no experiment has been able to distinguish between them.

Each interpretation is grouped by their general "flavor" (Collapse, Deterministic, Information-based, etc.) for clarity. The ones in RED are the most popular interpretations or flavor. I prefer number 2, but don't ask me to defend it!

A - The "Standard" & Collapse Theories (Reality changes when we look at it)

1 - Copenhagen Interpretation: The "textbook" view. Particles exist in a superposition of states until measured, at which point the wave function "collapses" into a single reality. It emphasizes that we shouldn't ask what happens before measurement.   Note: This is the "standard" or "textbook" view because it is practical: it tells you how to calculate results without worrying about what is happening "behind the scenes".

2 - Von Neumann–Wigner (Consciousness): A variation of Copenhagen, suggesting that a physical measuring device isn't enough to collapse the wave function; it requires a conscious observer (a human mind) to render reality concrete.

3 - GRW Theory (Spontaneous Collapse): Argues that collapse isn't caused by observers, but happens randomly and naturally. For a single electron, it's rare, but for a macroscopic object (like a cat) containing trillions of atoms, it happens instantly.

4 - Penrose Interpretation (Orch-OR): Suggests that gravity is the cause of collapse. When a superposition becomes "too heavy" (the difference in spacetime curvature is too large), it snaps into one state.

5 - Quantum Zeno Effect (Interpretation): Often discussed as a paradox, this view suggests that "a watched pot never boils." Continuous observation freezes a quantum system in its current state, preventing it from evolving.

B - The "Many Realities" Theories (Everything happens, somewhere)

6 - Many-Worlds Interpretation (Everett): There is no collapse. Every time a quantum event has multiple possible outcomes, all of them happen, each in a newly branching, separate universe.

7 - Many-Minds Interpretation: A dualistic variant of Many-Worlds. The physical universe doesn't branch, but the observer's mind branches into different mental states, each perceiving a different outcome.

8 - Cosmological Interpretation: Applies quantum mechanics to the entire universe at once. It posits that the "observer" is the universe itself evolving, often used to explain the early universe before humans existed.

9 - Quantum Darwinism (Zurek): Explains that we only see "stable" realities because they are the "fittest." Only quantum states that can copy themselves into the environment (decoherence) survive to be observed.

C - The Deterministic / Hidden Variable Theories (God does not play dice; we just can't see the dice)

10 - De Broglie–Bohm (Pilot Wave): Particles always have definite positions, but they are guided by a "pilot wave." The universe is deterministic and weirdly interconnected (non-local), but there is no "collapse."

11 - Stochastic Mechanics (Nelson): Suggests particles move in definite paths, but are buffeted by a universal "background noise" (like Brownian motion), making their paths look random to us.

12 - Superdeterminism: Argues that there is no "free will" in setting up an experiment. The choice of what to measure and the outcome were both determined at the Big Bang, eliminating quantum randomness by removing independence.

D - The Information / Epistemic Theories (Quantum mechanics is about knowledge, not reality)

13 - Quantum Bayesianism (QBism): The wave function doesn't describe the world; it describes the observer's expectations. Measurement is just an agent updating their beliefs, not a physical change in the universe.

14 - Relational Quantum Mechanics (Rovelli): Nothing has absolute properties. An electron's state is only defined relative to the system interacting with it. It can be "up" for one observer and "undefined" for another simultaneously.

15 - Information-Theoretic Interpretation: Suggests the universe is fundamentally made of information ("It from Bit"). Quantum mechanics describes the limit of how much information can be packed into a system.

16 - Ensemble Interpretation: Quantum mechanics doesn't apply to individual particles (like one electron), but only to groups (ensembles) of particles. It is a statistical tool, not a description of individual events.

E - The Time & Logic Theories (Changing how we view time and logic)

17 - Transactional Interpretation (Cramer): Particles send waves forward in time (offer) and backward in time (confirmation). A quantum event only happens when these waves "shake hands" across time.

18 - Two-State Vector Formalism: To understand the present, you need two wave functions: one coming from the past and one coming from the future. The future affects the present just as much as the past does.

19 - Consistent Histories: A framework that tries to assign probabilities to sequences of events (histories) without needing an external observer, provided the histories don't contradict each other.

20 - Quantum Logic: Suggests that the paradoxes arise because our human logic (Boolean logic) is wrong. In this view, the universe operates on a different logical grid where "A and B" works differently than in standard language. 

Shut Up and Calculate: Many adhere to the unwritten "Shut Up and Calculate" interpretation - the idea that since the math works perfectly for predicting experiments, worrying about what it means is philosophically interesting but scientifically unnecessary.

Expert "Consensus" Chart

Interpretation	REF	Expert Support	Notes
Copenhagen	1	36% – 42%	Still the most popular, largely because it is the "default" taught in universities. However, support has dipped slightly in recent years.
Information / Epistemic	D	17% – 24%	This group (including QBism) is rising fast. It views the wave function as "subjective knowledge" rather than physical reality.
Many-Worlds	6	15% – 18%	A strong second or third place. It is especially popular among cosmologists and quantum information theorists but remains controversial.
De Broglie–Bohm	10	7%	The leading "deterministic" theory. It has a small but very dedicated following.
Objective Collapse	3-4	< 5%	Theories like GRW or Penrose generally receive very low support in these polls.
None of the above / Undecided / Shut Up and Calculate	21	10% – 30%	a significant percentage of physicists opt out of these polls since the math works for science