Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Why Joshua Bowen Is Wrong About ‘Ebed and Biblical Slavery

Buying Labor, Not Flesh

Introduction

One of the central battlegrounds in the debate over biblical ethics is whether the Old Testament sanctioned chattel slavery - the buying, selling, and owning of human beings as permanent, disposable property. Skeptics and deconstruction advocates frequently argue that the Hebrew word ‘ebed (עֶבֶד) cannot be sanitized into modern notions of voluntary indentured service or contract labor.

In his book Did the Old Testament Endorse Slavery?, Assyriologist Dr. Joshua Bowen articulates what has become the flagship academic argument for the skeptic’s case. Bowen contends that within statutory legal texts like Leviticus 25:44–46, ‘ebed mirrors the Mesopotamian wardum - a legally degraded class of human chattel purchased (qānāh), held as permanent property (’aḥuzzāh), and passed down as an inheritable possession (nāḥal). According to Bowen, any attempt to interpret these arrangements as voluntary contract labor is linguistically and historically untenable.

While Bowen’s comparative linguistic credentials are formidable, his legal and historical conclusions fall apart under close scrutiny. By isolating statutory vocabulary from the governing legal architecture of the Torah, Bowen commits foundational category errors, ignores the radical ethical divergences between Israel and Mesopotamia, and overlooks the statutory provisions that dismantled chattel slavery at its core.

His core arguments regarding the term include:

  • Semantic Range vs. Legal and Contextual Definition: Bowen emphasizes that words cannot be reduced to a single, flat, generic meaning across all literature. While ‘ebed (derived from the root ‘-b-d, meaning to work or serve) has a wide semantic range - functioning honorifically for royal officials ("servant of the king") or worshipers ("servant of Yahweh") - its meaning in legal statutory codes is governed by syntax, enforceable status, and surrounding legal context. Within legal corpora, it designates a distinct socio-legal class that includes chattel slaves.

  • Comparative Semitics and Ancient Near Eastern Law (Wardum): As an Assyriologist, Bowen compares ‘ebed to its Akkadian cognate/equivalent wardum used in Mesopotamian legal collections, such as the Code of Hammurabi. A wardum could enjoy high social standing, manage property, or serve directly under a monarch, yet under the law remained the chattel property of another person. Bowen argues that Hebrew legal codes operated within this same ancient Near Eastern legal framework.

  • Governing Property Descriptors and Commercial Verbs: Bowen points out that in statutory passages like Leviticus 25:44–46, ‘ebed is directly modified by commercial property language:

    • Governed by commercial acquisition verbs like qānāh ("to buy" or "to purchase").

    • Explicitly categorized as ’aḥuzzāh ("possession" or "property").

    • Designated for nāḥal ("inheritance"), meaning they could be passed down to an owner's children as permanent, inheritable assets in perpetuity.

Bowen concludes that interpreting ‘ebed as a voluntary "employee" or mere hired hand in these legal contexts is linguistically and historically untenable, as ancient societies did not buy, own as property, or inherit employees.

Refutation of Joshua Bowen on ‘Ebed and Biblical Slavery

Dr. Joshua Bowen contends that apologetic appeals to the wide semantic range of the Hebrew noun ‘ebed (עֶבֶד) constitute special pleading. Bowen argues that:
  • In statutory legal contexts, ‘ebed operates like its Akkadian legal cognate wardum (Code of Hammurabi), designating a distinct, degraded class of human chattel.
  • In passages like Leviticus 25:44–46, ‘ebed is governed by commercial property terminology (qānāh / "buy," ’aḥuzzāh / "property/possession," and nāḥal / "inherit"), proving that foreign ‘ăbāḏîm were inheritable chattel slaves rather than contract laborers.
While Bowen’s linguistic and comparative analysis reflects conventional secular Assyriology, his conclusion that Mosaic law sanctioned chattel slavery collapses when evaluated against the legal framework of the Torah and the broader socio-economic realities of the Ancient Near East (ANE).

1. The Legal Defeaters of Chattel Slavery in Mosaic Law

Under standard legal definitions, chattel slavery requires three indispensable pillars:
  • Human beings are treated as movable commercial property.
  • Persons can be captured, held, or trafficked involuntarily against their will.
  • Masters possess absolute legal rights of ownership, including the enforceable power to recapture escaped "property."

As demonstrated in Seven Facts About Biblical Slavery Prove that It Was Not Chattel Slavery, the Torah established statutory mandates that dismantle the foundational pillars of chattel ownership:

  • The Anti-Kidnapping Law (Exodus 21:16):

    "Whoever steals a man and sells him, and anyone found in possession of him, shall be put to death."

    Under the Code of Hammurabi (§14), stealing another man's minor son was a capital crime, but capturing and reducing adults to slavery was routine practice. In sharp contrast, the Mosaic statute is absolute: stealing, trafficking, or forcibly possessing any person carried an unconditional death penalty. As Christian philosopher and ethicist Paul Copan notes (Is God a Moral Monster?, pp. 135–137), since involuntary capture, sale, and forced possession were capital crimes, no lawful Israelite institution could ever be predicated upon kidnapped or trafficked human beings.

  • The Anti-Extradition Sanctuary Law (Deuteronomy 23:15–16):

    "You must not return an escaped slave to his master when he has run away to you. Indeed, he may live among you in any place he chooses, in whichever of your villages he prefers; you must not oppress him."

    Throughout the ancient Near East, returning runaway slaves was strictly mandated. In the Code of Hammurabi (§§15–16) and Hittite law, harboring an escaped slave was punishable by death. Mosaic law instituted the exact opposite: universal, mandatory asylum for runaway ‘ăbāḏîm, completely stripping masters of the legal right to recover their "property." As legal historian Raymond Westbrook observed in the History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (HANEL, Vol. 2, p. 1007), this legal guarantee of sanctuary had the structural effect of transforming servitude into a voluntary institution. An entity that possesses the legal right to walk away without penalty cannot be defined as chattel property.

2. The Semantic Fallacy Concerning Qānāh ("Buy") and Property Terminology

Bowen contends that because ‘ebed is linked with qānāh ("to buy"), ’aḥuzzāh ("possession/property"), and nāḥal ("inherit") in Leviticus 25:44–46, it must denote human chattel. This argument commits an anachronistic category error, imposing modern commercial property concepts onto ancient covenantal terminology:

  • The Semantic Range of ‘Ebed:

    Old Testament theologian John Goldingay (Old Testament Theology, Vol. 3, p. 460) directly challenges the assumption that ‘ebed translates cleanly to the degraded, dehumanizing category of "slave" in English:

    "There is nothing inherently lowly or undignified about being an ‘ebed... it was an honourable and dignified term."

    The noun indicates a socio-legal relationship of service, subordination, or dependency—stretching from court officials and prophets to household workers - not the commercial ownership of human flesh.

  • The Scope of Qānāh (Acquiring Contractual Rights):

    As Old Testament scholar Douglas K. Stuart (Exodus, NAC, pp. 473–478) and Paul Copan point out, the Hebrew verb qānāh routinely describes acquiring legal or contractual rights through a payment; it does not require purchasing human beings as livestock. For instance:

    • Eve states that she has "acquired/gotten" (qānāh) a man with the help of the Lord (Genesis 4:1).

    • Boaz announces that he has "acquired/purchased" (qānāh) Ruth the Moabitess to be his wife (Ruth 4:10). Boaz did not purchase Ruth as chattel; he paid the required redemption price to legally acquire the contractual rights and duties of marriage.

    • In ancient indentured servitude, "buying" a servant meant paying a lump sum to acquire the exclusive legal rights to that individual's labor over an agreed period, not the ownership of their person.

  • The Meaning of ’Aḥuzzāh and Inheritance (Nāḥal):

    In Leviticus 25:45–46, ’aḥuzzāh ("holding" or "tenure") and nāḥal ("inherit") apply to the household labor agreement passed down within the family estate. In an ancient clan-based agrarian society devoid of banking infrastructure, institutional safety nets, or formal corporate contracts, long-term labor obligations were transacted and inherited at the household level. That an arrangement was hereditary does not make it chattel slavery - especially when foreign workers retained fundamental legal protections, could leave under the protection of Deuteronomy 23:15–16, and could even accumulate personal wealth to purchase their own independence (Leviticus 25:47).

3. Mesopotamian Wardum vs. Israelite ‘Ebed: A False Equivalence

Bowen's comparison between the Hebrew ‘ebed and the Akkadian wardum glosses over the foundational ethical and legal divergences between Israelite statutory law and surrounding Mesopotamian jurisprudence:

  • Human Worth vs. Property Restitution:

    In Mesopotamian legal collections (e.g., Code of Hammurabi §§196–205), slaves were legally classed with livestock. If a third party killed a wardum, the compensation was paid strictly to the owner as property restitution, equivalent to reimbursing an injured ox. In contrast, under Exodus 21:20, if an Israelite master beat an ‘ebed to death, the master faced lethal legal retribution (nāqōm yinnāqēm / "he shall surely be avenged/punished"). Human life in Israel was protected by the imago Dei, not by commercial property values.

  • Bodily Harm and Unconditional Freedom:

    Old Testament ethicist Walter C. Kaiser Jr. (Toward Old Testament Ethics, pp. 98–104) highlights the revolutionary nature of Exodus 21:26–27: if an owner struck a servant and knocked out a tooth or blinded an eye, the servant walked away completely free. In pagan ANE codes, an owner had total legal license to physically discipline or maim their chattel without forfeiting property rights. In Israel, permanent injury dissolved the service agreement immediately, legally demonstrating that the servant's person was not property.

  • The Humanitarian Shift in World Literature:

    The renowned secular Assyriologist Muhammad A. Dandamayev (Slavery in Babylonia, p. 34) noted this sharp historical divergence between cuneiform law and the Hebrew Scriptures:

    "We have in the Bible the first appeals in world literature to treat slaves as human beings for their own sake and not just in the interests of their masters."

  • A Poverty-Driven Institution:

    As surveyed across ancient legal documents in Raymond Westbrook's History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (HANEL, Vol. 1, pp. 199, 449, 585, 741), the vast majority of servitude throughout the ancient Near East was voluntary self-sale or family placement driven by extreme poverty, famine, and debt—not military chattel enslavement. In an ancient world without government welfare, becoming an ‘ebed was an essential survival mechanism.

Bibliography
  • Bowen, Joshua. Did the Old Testament Endorse Slavery? Mechanicsville: Digital Hammurabi Press, 2020.  Presents the secular Assyriological argument comparing the Hebrew ‘ebed to Akkadian legal categories and arguing for chattel slavery in Leviticus 25.
  • Copan, Paul. Is God a Moral Monster? Making Sense of the Old Testament God. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2011 (pp. 124–137).  Refutes chattel definitions of Old Testament servitude, analyzing the contractual nature of commercial terms like qānāh and the legal impact of anti-kidnapping and asylum laws.
  • Dandamayev, Muhammad A. Slavery in Babylonia: From Nabopolassar to Alexander the Great (626–331 BC). Edited by Marvin A. Powell. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1984 (p. 34). Presents research from a leading secular Assyriologist recognizing that the Hebrew Bible represents the earliest legal shift in world history toward recognizing servants as persons rather than mere property.
  • Goldingay, John. Old Testament Theology, Vol. 3: Israel’s Life. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009 (p. 460).  Examines the lexical and theological meaning of ‘ebed, establishing that the term carries no inherent indignity and denotes subordination or service rather than chattel slavery.
  • Kaiser, Walter C., Jr. Toward Old Testament Ethics. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983 (pp. 98–104, 162–165).  Analyzes Mosaic legal protections for servants, showing how laws governing bodily harm (Exodus 21:26–27) subvert ancient Near Eastern property concepts.
  • Stuart, Douglas K. Exodus. The New American Commentary, Vol. 2. Nashville: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 2006 (pp. 473–488).  Provides detailed exegesis of Exodus 21 and the legal terminology governing Hebrew servitude, explaining why Hebrew commercial terms refer to contracted labor rights rather than human ownership.
  • Westbrook, Raymond, ed. A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (HANEL), 2 vols. Handbuch der Orientalistik. Leiden: Brill, 2003 (Vol. 1, pp. 199, 449, 585, 741; Vol. 2, p. 1007).  Comprehensive academic survey of ancient Near Eastern legal collections; documents the economic, poverty-driven nature of ancient debt-servitude and notes that Deuteronomy 23:15–16 effectively turned biblical servitude into a voluntary institution.

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Why Joshua Bowen Is Wrong About ‘Ebed and Biblical Slavery

Buying Labor, Not Flesh Introduction One of the central battlegrounds in the debate over biblical ethics is whether the Old Testament sancti...